I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding how a MitM attack works.I didn't say a MitM attack would require STARTTLS. I'm saying a MitM attack only works if there's no security on the connection at all and since Plesk requires STARTTLS on 587, the certificate validation would fail once STARTTLS was attempted to be negotiated (which occurs prior to authentication) unless either:
1. The user intentionally ignores the warning from the mail app, or
2. There's a malicious or hacked certifying authority that granted an SSL certificate to the MitM attacker that matches the hostname of the server (or the mail domain).
But these exceptions are identical for SSL/TLS over 465.
This means 587 with required STARTTLS before auth should be equally as secure as 465 with SSL/TLS.
In case of such an attack, the attacked user wants to contact the plesk server, but instead contacts the MitM server because someone managed to tweak DNS or routing or whatever.
Now why would that MitM server tell the user's client that it requires STARTTLS?
It won't. It will just ask the client to authenticate. So if the client has no setting to never send passwords unencrypted, it will happily give its credentials to the MitM server. Which can then contact the plesk server, use STARTTLS, log in using these credentials, and relay the data to the client so the user won't notice anything.